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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND
ITS APPLICATION TO U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS
IN CHINA
Eric M. Pedersen*
INTRODUCTION

As a result of globalization, "every public company, private domestic
concern and private equity/hedge fund [is] in direct contact with a U.S. federal
statute and, in many cases, with foreign laws as well that prohibit the offer,
promise to pay, payment, or gift of money or anything of value-in other words,
as the statute sees it: bribes-to a foreign government official."' This is
particularly true in the Asian-Pacific region, which is home to some of the most
robust trade and security partners of the United States. With China quickly
assuming a prominent place in the global community, 2 it has become extremely
attractive to U.S. businesses and investors.3 Likewise, U.S. capital markets are
the most attractive destination for Chinese initial public offerings.4
* The positions and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
views of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Navy. The
author (LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 2007; J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law,
2000; B.S., Sam Houston State University, 1996) is an active duty Navy Judge Advocate, presently
serving as a Trial Counsel in the Pacific Northwest. The author would like to thank Professor
Jonathan C. Drimmer, of the Georgetown University Law Center, for his invaluable guidance,
comments, and patience on earlier drafts of this article, without which this article would never have
come into being; Kimberly N. Dobson and the staff of the Hofstra University Journal of
International Business and Law for all of their hard work and diligence in preparing the final draft of
this article; his parents Tom and Sally Pedersen for their unwavering love and support and for
making everything possible; his friends Chris Shaver, Jeff Wilser and Tania Krebs for being the
positive role models that got him on the right path and inspired him to go to law school; his
supervisor Kim Hinson for her support and mentorship during the writing of this paper; his children
Gregory and Abigail who remind him every day what is truly important in life; and his wife and best
friend Heather for her love, patience and understanding throughout both his legal education and
career endeavors.
Paul R. Berger & Bruce E. Yannett, FCPA: What It Is and Why It Matters to You: Documentation
and Accounting Controls Are Among the Business Practices Covered By the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, BANK AccT. & FIN., Apr. 1,2007, at 46.
2 Michael Michalak, U.S. Senior Official for APEC, Remarks to the Asia Society's Annual APEC
2005 Breakfast Briefing (Dec. 1, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/michalak05.html).
3 Peter S. Goodman, China Market is Fertile Fieldfor Bribes American Firms Run Afoul of Law,
SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at El.

4 Kevin Hamilton, Battling for China's IPOs: The London Stock Exchange Wants a Piece of the
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Unfortunately, corruption in China is a significant issue 5 and while
China has recently adopted extensive anti-corruption measures, significant
concern still remains over the extent to which these measures will be enforced.6
Given the fact that corruption in China is widespread, 7 and the government still
owns and manages the country's largest companies, 8 compliance with the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter "FCPA") can be exceptionally
challenging for U.S. corporations that conduct business operations in China.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter "SEC") and the
Department of Justice (hereinafter "DOJ") have recently begun an aggressive
enforcement approach to the FCPA9 - which has its grounding in securities
law 10 and gives dual jurisdiction to both the SEC and DOJ" - due largely to12
"companies moving more aggressively into emerging markets like... China.'
In the wake of numerous domestic corporate scandals (e.g. Enron and
WorldComl 3), the new U.S. interest in the bolstering economy of China has led
to increased international actions to combat corruption, 14 as well as increased
class action lawsuits against Chinese-based companies listed in the United
States. 15 With the recent increase in FCPA cases pursued by the DOJ and the
SEC, 1 6 it is imperative that U.S. companies conducting business operations in
China comply with the FCPA.
Chinese Market, but State-Owned Enterprisesare Shunning Overseas Listings. Does that Signal
FlaggingSupportfor CorporateReform in China?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1, 2005, at 34.
5 See generally Don Dufree, Corruptor Careless?, CFO MAGAZINE, Mar. 20, 2007, availableat
http://cfo.com/article.cfm/8870064?f=search.
6 Corruptionin China: Not the Best Way to Clean Up, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/word/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story-id=9040393.
7 Paul W. Boltz, Jr., Are You Ready For China?: The World Has a New Player, 16 ABA Bus. L.
TODAY 27 (Jan./Feb. 2007), availableat http://www/abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-0102/boltzjr.shtrnl.
8 The Long and Winding Road to Privatizationin China, KNOWLEDGE@ WHARTON, May 10, 2006,
available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1472&specialid=53.
9 Elliott Leary, Joseph P. Dooley & Nicole Stryker, Trends in FCPA Enforcement, 15
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 5 (May 2007).
'0 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (2002).
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(h)(9)(b) (2002).
12 William Olson, Don't Let U.S. Focus Crimp Oversight Abroad: With Increased SEC and DOJ
Scrutiny on U.S. Companies' Business Practicesin Foreign Countries,a Myopic Focus on U.S.
Policies and ProceduresCan Detractfrom Oversight of FCPA Violations, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE,
Jan. 1, 2007, at 24.
13 See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, (June 1, 2003). 81 WASH. U. LAW QUARTERLY 357, (2003).
"4 David M. Luna, Director for Anticorruption and Governance Initiatives, Remarks to the 2002
International Institute for Public Ethics Conference, (Oct. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/2002/1388I .htm.
15 Hamilton, supra note 4.
16 Leary et al., supra note 9.
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This article will examine the Chinese economy and the FCPA's recent
impact on U.S. corporations and investors who conduct, or are contemplating
conducting, business operations in China. Part I of this paper will summarize
the provisions of the FCPA. Part II will look at the economy of China and how
its vast potential for economic growth has drawn U.S. businesses to the Far
East. Part III will explore the problem China presently faces internally with
corruption. Part IV will analyze several recent, high-profile FCPA cases
brought against U.S. corporations that conducted business operations in China.
Part V will highlight the unique application of the FCPA in China, including the
heightened scrutiny the U.S.-half of a U.S.-China joint venture has to investigate
activities of the Chinese-half. This section will also explore how the definition
of a "foreign official" may differ in business dealings with communist China in
contrast to other countries. Part VI will discuss the extent to which the FCPA
puts U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage to their foreign counterparts
who do not vigorously enforce anti-bribery laws. This paper concludes that the
FCPA does, in fact, put U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage in China;
a rapidly developing country with enormous investment potential, yet a
considerable problem with corruption. However, this paper also recognizes that
adherence to the FCPA remains critical in the current, ongoing, international
battle against corrupt business activities. Part VII will explore two potential
remedial measures that could modify and strengthen the FCPA to accomplish its
worthy purposes without negatively impacting U.S. business activities abroad.
PART I: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The FCPA was passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal in the
1970s. 17 After its passage, SEC investigations uncovered over 400 cases of U.S.
businesses involved in illegal or questionable payments to foreign government
officials amounting to over $300 million. 18 This "included some of the largest
and most widely held public companies in the United States."' 9 The discovered
abuses ranged "from bribery of high foreign officials in order to secure some
type of favorable action by the foreign govemment" to payments "made to
ensure that government functionaries discharge certain ministerial [sic] or
clerical duties. 2 ° Congress found the payment of bribes to influence the acts
and decisions of foreign officials to be unethical, unnecessary and "bad
business," as it "eroded public confidence in the integrity of the [American] free

17Maki Hishikawa, The FCPA: An Outgrowth of CorporateScandals, JAPAN COMMERCE
ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON, DC, Mar. 2003.

18Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977).
'9Id. at 4.
20 id.
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market system., 21 Therefore, in 1977 Congress enacted the FCPA as a means of
discouraging the bribery of
foreign officials and restoring integrity to the
22
American business system.
A. FCPA Provisions
The provisions of the FCPA can be broken down into two distinct
parts: (1) the prohibition against the bribery of foreign officials by American
corporations, 23 and (2) the requirements for record-keeping and accounting
practices that prohibit the establishment of undercover accounts used to finance
illegal payments. 24
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions prohibit people and corporations
from engaging in a variety of activities and transactions. The statute explains
that issuers of certain U.S. securities - or any officers, directors, employees, or
agents of the issuers - cannot use the mails, phone systems, intemet or any other
instrumentality of interstate commerce "in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or an authorization to make an offer, payment, or gift" to any
foreign official, foreign political party, or candidate for a foreign political
office.25 This provision applies to any situation in which there is a "corrupt"
purpose of either (i) influencing an act or decision of that foreign official, (ii)
obtaining or retaining business, (iii) directing a business to a particular person,
or (iv) to securing an improper advantage.26 Simply put, the FPCA makes it
unlawful for U.S. persons, U.S. companies and certain foreign issuers listed on
U.S. securities exchanges, to make payments to foreign officials for the purpose
of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person.27 A simple offer, promise, or authorization of a bribe will trigger a
violation of the FCPA.28
Although the FCPA does not apply directly to a foreign subsidiary of a
U.S. business that engages in conduct that is prohibited by the FCPA, the U.S.
parent business will be deemed to have violated the FCPA if they "authorized,
directed, or controlled the activity in question., 29 This form of "knowledge" is

id.
22Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic
21

Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, S.REP. No. 95-114 (1977).
23 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, and 78dd-3 (2000).
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b) (2000).
25Id. (emphasis added).
26 id.
27 See generally id.
21

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 2(a), 3(a) (2000).

29 LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE TO FCPA, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS,

http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html.

16

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol7/iss1/2

4

Pedersen: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its Application to U.S. Bus

FoREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT & U.S. BUSINESS OPERATION IN CHINA

inferred under the FCPA if a corporation "is aware that such person is engaging
in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially
certain to occur; or such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists
or that such result is substantially certain to occur." 30
"Knowledge" also
includes "conscious disregardand deliberate ignorance. 31
The FCPA's record-keeping and accounting provisions are the lesser
known, but equally important, aspects of the FCPA which were added to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.32
These record-keeping provisions
require U.S. corporations to keep books, records and accounts in reasonable
detail, in a way that fairly reflects their transactions and the dispositions of their
assets.3 3
The FCPA's accounting provisions require that every issuer of
securities (i.e. businesses with securities registered with the SEC under section
12 or required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934) to:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in

reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain
accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
'0 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2) (2000).
3' LAY-PERSON's GUIDE TO FCPA, supra note 29.
32 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §13(b)(2), amended by Act of July 30, 2002, 15 U.S.C.A.
§78m(b)(2) (2002) ("Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12
and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) shall--A. make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; B. devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that- i. transactions are executed in
accordance with management's general or specific authorization; ii. transactions are recorded as
necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (H) to maintain
accountability for assets; iii. access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; and iv. the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences.")
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(a) (2000).
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management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and
appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences. 34
These provisions give "the SEC authority over the entire financial
management and reporting requirements of publicly held United States
corporations." 35 Their purpose is to prevent issuers from concealing bribes and,
more specifically, to discourage fraudulent accounting and reporting practices.
These provisions also provide a basis for ascribing liability to U.S. parent
companies of foreign subsidiaries. Since these accounting provision violations
do not require proof of criminal intent, a corporation can more easily be held
strictly liable for the actions of a foreign subsidiary under the FCPA.36
B. Exceptions to the FCPA's Anti-Bribery Prohibitions
The prohibitions of the FCPA are subject to three exceptions. The
first, which came by way of an amendment to the FCPA in 1988, permits the
use of "grease" or "facilitating" payments to foreign officials for the purpose of
expediting or securing the performance of a routine governmental action.37
"Grease" payments are usually small payments to minor government officials
that provide extra incentive to perform routine governmental action.38 The
phrase "routine governmental action" refers to actions that a government official
would regularly perform. 39 Examples of routine governmental action would
include "obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;" "providing police protection;"
"loading and unloading cargo;" "processing governmental papers, such as visas
and work orders;" and priority in scheduling inspections. 40 The second
exception is for legitimate business purposes and allows a U.S. corporation to
utilize its funds for the purpose of educating a foreign official about its business,

34

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000).

35 SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
36 LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 29.

" 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (b) (2000); see also Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: It's
Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 379, 379
(2005).
38 See generally, Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It's Time to Cut Back the
Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 379 (2005).
39 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- I(f)(3)(A) (2000).
4 Id.
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product, or activities. 4 1 The last exception to the prohibition of the FCPA
allows for the payments of bribes in countries where bribery is legal. 42 This
exception requires that the law permitting bribery be in writing,43 and is
therefore rarely, if ever, invoked.
C. Inside Information
In 1998, the FCPA was amended again to implement the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter "OECD") on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions. 44 This amendment made several significant changes in the FCPA,
including broadening the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA to non-U.S. persons
acting within the United States, as well as to U.S. persons outside of the United
States.45 The amendments also prohibited making corrupt payments to a foreign
official for the purpose of "securing any improper advantage" to obtain or retain
business46 As amended, the FCPA not only prohibits:
[P]ayments to foreign officials not just to buy any act or
decision, and not just to induce the doing or omitting of an
official function "to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining

business for or with, or directing business to, any person," but
also the making of a payment to such a foreign official to
secure an "improper advantage" that will assist in obtaining or
retaining business.47
U.S. corporations can still fall under the umbrella of the FCPA for
making corrupt payments even if the purpose of such payments is not
necessarily to obtain business. If a foreign, state-owned business was to solicit
bids for a new business and kept certain information confidential, then anything
provided or anything offered of value for the purpose of obtaining disclosure of
that confidential information may result in an FCPA violation.48
41

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), 2(c)(2), 3(c)(2) (2000).

42 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1) (2000).
43 id.
44 S. 2375, 105th Cong. (1998).

45 FCPA International Initiatives, FCPA Enforcement: International Agreements,
http://www.fcpaenforcement.com/documents/document-detail.asp?[D=713&PAGE=4.
46International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, sec. 2(a)(l)(A)(iii), § 78dd-l(a),
112 Stat. 3302, 3302 (1998).
47 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5t ' Cir. 2004).
48 Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Unique Problemswith FCPA Compliance in the P.R.C., 2007
A.B.A. SEC. Bus. LAW vol. 16 No. 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-0506/slear.shtmi.
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Use of inside information from a foreign official can subject a
corporation to liability under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, which prohibits the use of material, non-public information for the
purchase or sale of a security. 49 In addition, an employee of a U.S. corporation
who makes a payment, or promises to make a payment to a Chinese foreign
official for the purpose of obtaining confidential, non-public information may
subject the business to liability under the FCPA.
D. Penalties for FCPA Violations
Violations of either the accounting or bribery provisions of the FCPA
can subject individuals and/or corporations to both criminal and civil penalties. 5°
Individual officers, directors and employees of a company may be prosecuted
for violations of the FCPA even if their company is not liable.51 Criminal
violations can lead to substantial fines and prison terms.52 Civil liability can
also result in considerable fines.53 Additionally, the SEC has been increasingly
ordering U.S. businesses to disgorge any profits made through violations of the
FCPA,54 which often results in businesses settling FCPA suits at practically
double the cost of settlement.55 In addition to civil and criminal penalties, an
individual or corporation found to be in violation of the FCPA may be subject to
additional governmental actions such as barring a corporation from conducting
business with the federal government, refusing export licenses, and possible
suspension or debarment from programs provided by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.56
E. FCPA Enforcement
The FCPA has had a significant impact on the manner in which U.S.
corporations conduct foreign business operations.57 Since its enactment:
[s]everal firms that paid bribes to foreign officials have been
the subject of criminal and civil enforcement actions, resulting
in large fines and suspension and debarment from federal
'9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
50 15 U.S.C. §78ff (2000).
5' H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 923-24 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).

52 15 U.S.C. §78ff(a) (2000).

5 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (2000).
54 Leary et al., supra note 9; see also, 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (2000).
55 Leary et al., supra note 9.
56 See LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 29.

57 Leary et al., supra note 9.
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procurement contracting, and their employees and officers
have gone to jail. To avoid such consequences, many firms
have implemented detailed compliance programs intended to
prevent and to detect any improper payments by employees
and agents.5 s
Recently, the DOJ has affirmed its commitment to stamping out global
corruption through aggressive enforcement of the FCPA. 59 This has been
observed through a significant increase in investigations by the DOJ and SEC.6 °
By 2006, 49 individual and corporate defendants had been prosecuted by the
DOJ, resulting in over 27 plea agreements. 6' In addition, over 38 cases were
disposed of by the SEC, resulting in agreements to avoid further violations of
the FCPA and disgorgements of profits received as a result of the corrupt
activities.62 U.S. corporations that conduct business in China have been one of
the focuses of recent FCPA investigations.63
PART II: THE ECONOMY OF CHINA
During the era of Mao Tse-tung, the phrase "revolution is not a dinner
party" illuminated the Maoist vision for the future of an internationally
respected China. 64 Mao saw the concept of collective political consciousness as
more important for the greater good of the nation than material incentive, which
was the goal of the corrupt and economically disparate Nationalist regime of the
time.65
After the death of Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of
the Communist Party of China and greatly reformed the Chinese economy based
on economic development and market-oriented policies.66 These economic
reforms, which began in the late 1970's, led to an increase in economic growth
in China which has astonished the world. "Between 1979 and 1997, the growth

58See LAY-PERSON'S

GUIDE TO THE FCPA, supra note 29.

59Alice S. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Remarks to the A.B.A. on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2006/10/2006-481010-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
60Olson, supra note 12.
61 Tom Leander, In China, You Better Watch Out, Mar. 20, 2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfn/562233 1/i/c_2984409?f=homefeatured.
id.
63 Olson, supranote 12.
62

64 Cheng Li, Revolution Is No Dinner Party, But China'sReform Is,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/communism (last visited Feb. 20,2008).
65 id.
66 Id.
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67
rate of China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 9.8 percent annually."
Economic reforms have also led to a "gradual liberalization of prices," fiscal
transference, increased independence for state enterprises, "development of
stock markets," the "growth of the non-state sector," the groundwork for a
"diversified banking
system," and the overall "opening to foreign trade and
68
investment.,
The worldwide growth rate has received the largest contribution from
China since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 69 Since
2003, China's economy has grown an astonishing 10 percent each year and will
likely increase 7 percent annually until 2020, when it is predicted to become the
second largest economy in the world, behind the United States.7 ° In the year
2004:

Americans spent $162 billion more on Chinese goods than the
Chinese spent on U.S. products. And that gap has been
growing by more than 25 percent per year, as China moves
from building toys and tchotchkes into more-sophisticated
appliances, auto parts, and semiconductors. China's consumer
class, meanwhile, is spending like lottery winners on
everything from bagels to Bentleys-and will soon outnumber
the entire U.S. population. China's explosive growth "could be
the dominant event of this century," says Stapleton Roy,
former U.S. ambassador to China.
"Never before has a country
71
risen as fast as China is doing.,
Recent developments indicate that the economy of China sees no signs of
slowing, nor does the government desire the tapering off of its incredible
development. In 2003, Chinese leadership claimed it would "continue to focus
on the country's economic development, with a goal to quadruple the country's
gross domestic product (GDP) within 20 years. 72 In 2006, the Chinese
government announced its Five-Year Plan which states China's intention to
67

id.

61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK - CHINA,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ (last visited Feb.
19,2008).
69 Chinese Economy to Contribute More to World Growth, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 20,

2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200609/20/eng20060920 304558.html.
70 Id., see also Richard J. Newman, The Rise of a New Power, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 20,

2005, at 40 (explaining that by 2020 China's progress in the global market could severely diminish
the role of the U.S.).
71 See Newman, supra note 70.
72 Gang Lin, China's Economy: Will the Bubble Burst?, 111 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REP. 1
(2003), http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/Chinese%20economy.pdf.

22
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pursue policies designed to improve the following five different areas of the
Chinese society:
(a) growth in domestic consumption and exports to
international markets
(b) development of inland and rural costal areas
(c) development of rural and urban areas
(d) promotion of a harmonious society and economic growth,
and
(e) the needs of both the environment and man.73
Today China is the "fastest growing economy in the world, 74 and with
its economy flourishing in ways never imagined, China has become an attractive
place for U.S. corporations to conduct operations and investments. This is due
not only to China's "low-cost manufacturing facilities" and its "market for hightechnology goods, 75 but also to its "good infrastructure, an educated
workforce," a soaring "rate of saving available to finance investment," and its
open economy. 76
A study conducted by the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC),
revealed that 81% of U.S. businesses reported that their China operations were
profitable.77 Additionally, more than half of those businesses claimed that
profitability rates for their operations in China either met "or exceed[ed] their
company's global profit margin., 78 Former White House Council of Economics
Advisor Kristen Forbes noted that "[c]ompanies are seeing some of their fastest
growth in China, and it's profitable growth.,, 79 Another commentator has noted

that "China has become a magnet for investment and a huge potential market
beckoning with growth." 80
Deng's shift away from Maoist principles significantly paved the way
present
state of the economy in China. Consequentially, the shift away
for the
from the Maoist principles of an economically equal and internationally
respected China have been pushed aside in favor of a new aphorism; one that
encapsulates China today: "To get rich is glorious." 8'

73 Boltz, supra note 7.
74 China's Economy Believed to Catch Up with U.S., CHINA KNOWLEDGE PRESS, June 7, 2007,
availableat 2007 WLNR 10578282.
75 William D. Greenlee, Jr., Business Not as Usual in China, NEV. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 11.
76 The Real GreatLeap Forward,THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2004, at 1.

77 US-China Bus. Council Staff, Companies Speak: The State of U.S. Business in China, THE CHINA
Bus. REV., Sept. 2006, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0609/survey.html.
78 id.
79 Goodman, supra note 3.
80 Id.
8' Li, supra note 64.
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PART III: CORRUPTION IN CHINA
United States businesses and investors seeking to take advantage of the
lavish economic opportunities in China face challenging FCPA issues primarily
because corruption is so widespread in China and its largest companies are
owned and managed by the Chinese government. The battle against corruption
in China, while not optimistically viewed, nevertheless seems to be an emerging
theme of the Chinese government.
A. Climate of Corruption
Despite being an economy of unlimited economic potential,
"[c]orruption in China is a significant issue.', 82 While China has enacted many
extensive anti-corruption laws, enforcement of these laws is ostensibly driven
by political concerns rather than an effort to fix the problem.83
Transparency International is a global organization, influential among
investors and traders, that performs assessments and opinion surveys on the
perceived levels of corruption in over 150 countries.84 In its 2006 report, China
was given a score of 3.3 on its I - 10 scale, with one being the most corrupt and
ten being the least corrupt. 85 A study done by the Camegie Endowment for
International Peace revealed that corruption in China accounted for
approximately 13-16% of its gross domestic product. 86 Angang Hu, of the
Center for Chinese Study noted that "[c]orruption looms as one of the biggest
87
political and economic challenges that faces China in the twenty-first century.
Between December 2002 and November 2003, there had been 174,580
leading officials at various levels across China disciplined for violations of anticorruption laws. 88 This figure includes 6,043 at the county level and 21 at the
ministerial level. In the year 2004, over 500 Chinese suspects - most of whom
were public officials - had violated various anti-corruption laws. 89 In the first
82 Boltz, supra note 7.
81 See id. at 30-31.
" Transparency Int'l, the Global Coal. Against Corruption, TI Corruption Perceptions Index,
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
85 Id.

86 Angang Hu, Ctr. for China Study, Chinese Acad. of Sciences, Quinghua Univ., Corruption and
Anti-Corruption Strategies in China, Presented at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Feb. 13,
2001, Summary prepared by Radha Kuppalli, Junior Fellow,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=284.
87 Id.

88 ChinaDaily.com, Party Watchdog Vows to Fight Corruption,Feb. 23, 2004,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Feb/88114.htm.
89 ChinaDaily.com, China to Ratify UN Convention Against Corruption,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglishldoc/2005-10/22/content487050.htm

(last visited Jan. 14,
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commercial
ten months of 2006, China was faced with 8,010 cases involving
90
bribery, amounting to the equivalent of $110 million U.S. dollars.
China has become "increasingly plagued by government officials and
executives of state-owned companies who abscond with a large sum of public
money and flee overseas to escape from prosecution and punishment." 91 Chen
Liangyu, China's Chief of Shanghai, was recently implicated in a corruption
scandal involving the misuse of the Shanghai's public social security fund.92
Tian Fengshan, former governor of Heilongjiang Province and former minister
of land and resources in China, was recently sentenced to life in prison for
accepting over 4.36 million yuan (approximately $538,000) in bribes. 93 Both
the former vice-mayor of Beijing and the former head of the National Statistics
Bureau were also recently removed from their positions after corruption charges
came to light. 94 Other high ranking Chinese officials caught in acts of corruption
included the top procurator of Tianjin, former vice governor of Anhui and
former deputy head of the Jianqsu provincial legislature. 95 The former vice
director of China's Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of
Hainan Province, was recently tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for
taking bribes totaling over 4 million yuan (approximately $513,000).96 Crimes

committed by government officials in charge of state-owned enterprises have
become a commonality in China, accounting for 41.5% of all corruption and
bribery cases that were investigated in 2004. 97
The increasing issue of corruption in China has been blamed on a
litany of factors. Some argue that the low pay of China's government officials
has driven them to illegally seek additional income. 98 Others argue that "Chinabased companies simply conclude that a certain amount of corruption is
necessary to remain competitive, and they are willing to live with the risk of

2008).
90 People's Daily Online, China's Anti-Corruption Drive Fruitful,
http://english.people.com.cn/200701/09/eng20070109_339270.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
9' China to Ratify UN Convention Against Corruption, supra note 89.
92 ChinaDaily.com, President Hu Charts Path in Anti-Corruption Drive,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/10/content_779107.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
93 Liu Li, Ex-Minister Sentenced to Life Term for Bribery, CHINA DAILY.COM, Dec. 28, 2005,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/28/content_507214.htm.
94 President Hu Charts Path in Anti-Corruption Drive, supra note 92.
95 China's Anti-Corruption Drive Fruitful, supra note 90.
96 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, China Tackles
Commercial Bribery Cases Involving 4.5bln Yuan, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/xw/t2981 10.htm.
97 He Qinglian, What Are the Effects of China's Anti-Corruption Laws?, THE EPOCH TIMES, Oct. 17,
2006, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-10-17/47058.html.
98 Zengke He, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Reform China, 33 COMMUNIST AND POSTCOMMUNIST STUDIES 243, 251 (2000).
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possible government action against them." 99 Moreover,
[T]he most lucrative corruption occurs in the overlap of
government or party authority with private enterprise, where
business operators need official approval to acquire land, win
contracts or make sales. Inducements in such transactions
remain off the books, thus difficult for auditors to catch. 100
This places U.S. businesses in the complex dilemma of balancing the
desire to take advantage of the lucrative Chinese economy with complying with
the FCPA and thereby avoiding problems with the DOJ and SEC. Compliance
is even more problematic in a nation where business deals typically involve giftSeveral U.S. multinational corporations have
giving and entertaining. 1
admitted that "their firms routinely win [Chinese] sales by paying what could be
.to purchasing agents at government offices
considered bribes or kickbacks.
10 2
and state owned businesses."
B. Anti-Corruption Efforts in China
In a recent address to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
disciplinary body President Hu Jintao emphasized China's anti- corruption
efforts. 10 3 With the milieu of high-profile corruption cases which plagued China
in early 2007,14 investigations into the behavior of foreign officials and
commercial businesses have significantly increased. 10 5 Chinese leadership has
recognized
that corruption is a problem, one that "could destroy the Communist
10 6
Party.'
Corruption has a variety of significant effects on a country. It "distorts
markets and competition, breeds cynicism among citizens, undermines the rule
of law, damages government legitimacy, and corrodes the integrity of the
private sector. It is also a major barrier to international development-systemic
misappropriation by kleptocratic governments harms the poor."'1 7 On October
99 Boltz, supra note 7, at 3 1.
100Edward Cody, HundredsAre Reproved By Chinafor Corruption,WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at
A25, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4412-2004Dec 16.html.
1I Meg Utterback, Application of the ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct in the PRC, MONDAQ

BUSINESS BRIEFING (May 16, 2007).
'02 Goodman, supra note 3.
1o China Corruption: Power Tools, EXECUTIVE BRIEFING CHINA (Feb. 14, 2007).
104 id.

105Kenneth J. DeWoskin & Ian J. Stones, Facing the China CorruptionChallenge, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sept. 2006.
106 Corruptionin China, supra note 6.
107 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption,FOREIGN AFF.,
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31, 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Convention
against Corruption, °8 which essentially acknowledged the aforementioned
statement as a problem on a global scale. The Convention imposed numerous
requirements on its signatories to take affirmative steps to criminalize
corruption and implement mechanisms to combat international crimes of
corruption. 0 9
The convention was "widely supported by developing
countries" '1 0 and was ratified by China in 2005 in an aggressive step to deal
with its overwhelming problem with corruption."'
China recently announced plans for the establishment of the Corruption
Prevention Bureau as a means of fulfilling its obligations under the UN
Convention against Corruption." 2 Unfortunately, these plans have been
criticized for lack of investigative power and for providing too much objective
governmental discretion as to which officials will be investigated and
prosecuted." 3 The Chinese government, overall, has faced wide-spread
international criticism for taking little action to deal with foreign multinationals
for making corrupt payments." 4 Overall efforts to address the problem of
corruption have been criticized as being "half-hearted."' 1 5 One commentator
noted that "many China-based companies operate on a day-to-day basis with a
lot fewer restrictions than companies in the United States despite the existence
of numerous laws and regulations in China."'" 6 China has complex anti-bribery
laws that are very similar to the FCPA in that they prohibit corrupt payments to
foreign officials and kickbacks in commercial transactions, but these laws are
never consistently or rigorously enforced." 7 In fact, a recent OECD report
criticized China for its weak enforcement of its multinational anti-corruption
covenants."18
Since corruption continues to be a more significant threat in China than
in other nations, U.S. corporations conducting business operations in China are
under constant exposure to FCPA actions initiated by either the DOJ or the
SEC. The recent trend in enforcement activities illustrates the severity of
May-June 2006 at 76.
'0' G.A. Res. 58/4, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003).
109Id.
11oPatrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Boarders,47 VA. J. INT'L L.
413,429 (2007).
. China to Ratify UN Convention Against Corruption, supra note 89.
112Corruptionin China, supra note 6.
3 Id. at44.
114Wu Chen, View from China: Shanghai Confidential, CFO MAG., Apr. 1, 2007, availableat
http://www.efo.com/article.cfm/8885504/c-8910395?f=magazine-alsoinside.
'5 Corruptionin China, supra note 6.
116Boltz, supra note 7 at 28.
117Dufree, supranote 5.
"8 DeWoskin & Stones, supra note 105.
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criminal and civil penalties arising from FCPA violations.
PART IV: RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INVOLVING U.S.CHINA BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Several recent, high-profile cases illustrate how U.S. corporate
undertakings with China have led to FCPA actions brought by the DOJ and
SEC."19 As one commentator noted "China has not loomed large in the U.S.
caseload, but that is changing fast." 120 The FCPA violations involving
Diagnostic Products Corp., Schnitzer Steel Industries, Lucent Technologies, Inc.
and InVision Technologies, Inc. serve to highlight this growing trend.
A. Diagnostic Products Corporation
Diagnostic Products Corporation (hereinafter "DPC") was a "producer
12
and seller of diagnostic medical equipment" based in Los Angeles, California. 22'
DPC Tianjin Co. Ltd., was a wholly-owned subsidiary of DPC in China.1
From 1991 to 2002, DPC Tianjin made cash payments in the amount of $1.6
million to physicians and laboratory personnel who controlled purchasing
decisions at various state-owned hospitals in China. 123 The purpose of these
payments was to obtain and retain business with these hospitals. 124 Payments
were usually made in cash and delivered either by DPC Tianjin's employees by
way of mail or wire transfer. 125 This practice, which was authorized by the
general manager of DPC Tianjin, involved transactions with personnel who met
the definition of "foreign officials" under the FCPA because they were
employed by hospitals owned by the Chinese government. 126 These corrupt
all recorded in DPC Tianjin's books and records as legitimate
payments were 27
sales expenses.1

"19Leander, supra note 61.
120

Id.

121

Press Release, Dep't of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. Charged with Violating the Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2005/May/05-crm282.htm
122 Id.
123
124
125

id.
id.
In the Matter of Diagnostic Products Corp, Admin. Proc., File No. 3-11933, (May 20, 2005),

availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51724.pdf.
126 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, (DPC), supra note 121.
127 In the Matter of Diagnostic Products Corp., supra note 125.
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DPC pled guilty to violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and
agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $2 million. 28 As part of their plea
agreement, DPC agreed to cooperate with ongoing DOJ and SEC investigations
and to the appointment of an independent compliance consultant to monitor the
implementation of "new internal policies and procedures."'' 29 In addition to
action taken by the DOJ, the SEC ordered the DPC to cease and desist from
further violations of the FCPA and to disgorge approximately $2.8 million in illgotten gains, 3which
represented DPC's net profit in China during DPC Tianjin's
0
misconduct.'
B. Schnitzer Steel Industries
In October 2006, SSI International Far East Ltd. (hereinafter "SSI
Korea"), which was a subsidiary of Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc. (hereinafter
"Schnitzer Steel"), pled guilty in federal district court to violations of the FCPA,
including violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery and record keeping
provisions. 131 SSI Korea facilitated Schnitzer Steel's buying and reselling of
metal, including the sale of scrap metal by Japanese suppliers, to steel mills in
China and South Korea. 32 Over a five-year period between September 1999
and August 2004, SSI Korea made approximately $1.8 million dollars in corrupt
payments "to officers and employees of nearly all of Schnitzer Steel's
government-owned
customers in China and private customers in China and
133
South Korea."'
SSI Korea wired money for the corrupt payments to secret bank
accounts in South Korea, which were opened by the head of SSI Korea for the
purpose of receiving such payments. 134 The funds were then used to make
corrupt cash payments to the managers of Schnitzer's customers. 35 SSI also
gave gifts to managers of their government-owned customers. 36 A senior
official at Schnitzer Steel was aware of the corrupt payments and did, in fact,
authorize the wire transfers of the money to the secret bank accounts. 137 Certain
128See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, (DPC), supra note 121.
129 id.
'30

In the Matter of Diagnostic Products Corp., supra note 125.

131Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.'s Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to

Foreign Bribes and Agrees to Pay a $7.5 Million Criminal Fine, (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crimnallpr/pressreleases/2006/10/2006 480910-16-06schnitzerfraud.pdf.
132 Id.
133 id.

'34 In the Matter of Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., Admin. Proc., File No. 3-12456, (Oct. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf.
135id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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Japanese companies also provided SSI Korea with money to make corrupt
payments to managers of the Chinese steel mills.138 SSI Korea would then
1 39
deliver the money to the managers of the Japanese steel mill customers.
Corrupt payments were made by SSI Korea, on behalf of their Japanese
customers, to managers of Chinese government-owned steel mills in
approximately eight different transactions. 140 These payments were recorded in
Schnitzer Steel's books and records
as refunds, rebates, sales commissions, and
41
commission to the customer.'
The payments to managers of government-owned customers in China
amounted to over $204,000, while payments to private companies amounted to
over $1.6 million. 42 These payments were made to "managers of private
customers in South Korea and private and government owned customers in
China to induce them to purchase, and to secure an improper advantage with
respect to the purchase of scrap metal from Schnitzer Steel."' 143 Profits derived
from these corrupt payments included "realized gross revenue of approximately
$602,139,470 and profits of approximately $54,927,319 on scrap metal sold to
private sector Chinese and South Korean customers, and gross revenue of
approximately $96,396,740 and profits of approximately $6,259,104, on scrap
metal sold to government instrumentalities in China. ' "'"
As part of a deferred prosecution agreement entered into with the DOJ,
Schnitzer Steel agreed to pay a criminal fine of $7.5 million and to "accept
responsibility for the conduct of its employees, and the employees of its
subsidiary, in making corrupt payments and aiding and abetting the making of
false books and records entries; to adopt internal compliance measures; and to
cooperate with ongoing criminal and SEC civil investigations." 145 Finally,
given the fact that Schnitzer Steel had never provided training to its employees
on the requirements of the FCPA and failed to monitor its employees, 46 the
parent company also agreed to the appointment of an independent compliance
consultant47to review and monitor the implementation of a FCPA compliance
program.
In addition to criminal penalties, Schnitzer Steel incurred civil
penalties from the SEC. Schnitzer Steel was ordered by the SEC to "cease and

138

id.

139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.

142Press Release, Dep't of Justice, (Schnitzer), supra note 131.
143 Id.
144 id.
145

Id.
146In the Matter of Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., supra note 134.
147Press Release, Dep't of Justice, (Schnitzer), supra note 131.
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desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of
Sections 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B), and 30A of the Exchange Act."' 148 Finally,
Schnitzer Steel agreed to pay a civil1 fine
in the amount of approximately $7.7
49
million to the United States Treasury.
C. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
Lucent Technologies,
Inc. (hereinafter "Lucent") was a
telecommunications equipment operator with operations in China that
"accounted for 11 per cent of its revenue" for the 2003 fiscal year.' 50 During an
internal audit and subsequent investigation, Lucent discovered incidents and
deficiencies in its internal control program for its operations in China that
amounted to violations of the FCPA.151 Internal auditors also found that
Lucent's executive officials had bribed Chinese officials at state-owned
telecommunications companies. 152
In September 2006, the SEC "warned Lucent Technologies to expect
an 'enforcement action' over violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) by executives at its Chinese operations.' 53 This came even after
Lucent fired four executives of its Chinese operations including the president,
the chief operating officer, marketing executive and a finance manager. 154 Like
Schnitzer Steel, Lucent disclosed these violations to both the SEC and the
DOJ. 5 5 As of this writing, final disposition in this matter is still pending.
D. InVision Technologies, Inc.
InVision Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter "InVision") was a company
based in California that sold airport security screening products that were
designed to detect explosives in passenger luggage. 156 An investigation by the
148In the Matter of Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., supra note 134.
149 id.
150

Mark O'Neill, China's Give-and-Take TraditionsStrained by US Anti-Graft Efforts, SOUTH

CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 18, 2005, available at

http://www.chinawhys.com/img/SCMP-com%20-%20Archive%2OSearch%20%20Main%20Search.htm.
'51Jeffrey Gold, Lucent Says It May Face SEC Enforcement, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Sep06/0,4670,LucentSEC,00.html.
152 Goodman, supra note 3.

153Sumner Lemon, SEC Plans 'Action' Over Corruptionat Lucent China, Sept. 7, 2006,
http:lwww.infoworld.comlarticlel06/09/07/HNcorruptionatlucent_ l.html.
154Stephen Taub, Lucent Fires Fouron Bribery Suspicions, CFO, April 7, 2004,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3013085?f=related.
'55Gold, supra note 151.
156Dep't of Justice, InVision Technologies Enters into Agreement with the United States, (Dec. 6,
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DOJ and SEC revealed that from June 2002 through June 2004, InVision was
aware of the high probability that some of its foreign sales agents and
independent distributors in China were paying bribes in the amount of $95,000
to foreign government officials to obtain business for the company. 57 Despite
this knowledge, InVision still authorized payments to these agents or
distributors, and allowed them to conduct these transactions on InVision's
behalf.158 These corrupt payments
were recorded in InVision's books and
159
records as the cost of goods sold.
InVision paid a $500,000 criminal penalty for their violations of the
FCPA. 160 Additionally, the SEC issued a cease and desist order, directing
InVision to pay disgorgement and mandating both independent consultation for
management of InVision's books and records as well as the implementation of
an FCPA compliance program.161
PART V: THE FCPA's APPLICATION TO U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN CHINA

Recent enforcement actions by the DOJ and SEC illustrate how
business operations in China present unique FCPA concerns for U.S.
corporations hoping to take advantage of the booming Chinese economy. The
corruption level in China substantially increases the duty of a U.S. corporation
to investigate, and assume responsibility for, the Chinese-half of any U.S.-China
joint venture. Additionally, with a great number of Chinese businesses still
under the control or outright ownership of the Chinese government, U.S.
corporations are constantly faced with the unique problem of determining who
is a "foreign official" for purposes of the FCPA. These issues present very
serious and significant challenges to U.S. corporations.
A. Joint Ventures in China
A joint venture is defined as "a business undertaking by two or more
persons engaged in a single defined project. The necessary elements are: (1) an
express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose that the group intends to
carry out; (3) shared profits and losses; and (4) each member's equal voice in

2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04 crm_780.htm.
157In the Matter of GE InVision, Inc. (formerly known as InVision Technologies, Inc.), Exchange
Act Release No. 51, 199 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3451199.htm.
158 id.
159 id.
160 id.

161Exchange Act Release No. 51, 199, supra note 157.
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controlling the project."' 162 Usually joint ventures are formed when two parties
have a unique contribution of resources to make towards the development of a
commercial opportunity in a specific market, but nether party has all of the
necessary resources to develop the opportunity.' 63 The U.S.-half of the joint
venture will usually contribute the resources it has available in its own domestic
market such as capital, trademarks, technology, management and any expertise
with regard to the particular opportunity. 64 The foreign-half of the joint venture
may contribute the same resources as its joint U.S. counterparts. However, the
foreign-half may contribute resources to the joint venture that would be
expensive, if not impossible, for the U.S.-half to acquire. These resources may
include insight into local customs and cultures, language skills, foreign business
expertise, and most importantly, the right to pursue the foreign
opportunity that
165
would otherwise be limited by the laws of the foreign nation.
In 1979, China passed the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law,
which was followed by a flood of similar legislations designed to promote
investment in China. 166 Joint ventures between U.S. and Chinese businesses are
usually attractive ways for a U.S. business to take advantage of the Chinese
market. Many U.S. businesses have come to the realization that in order to be
competitive in domestic markets it is imperative to compete in global markets as
well. The 1990's saw a substantial increase in "foreign direct investment (FDI)
and research and development (R&D)-related activity" by U.S.-owned
businesses in China. 167 This was significantly noticeable in China's information
technology sector, which saw a number of businesses increasing their
technology development activities, to exploit China's technological
capabilities. 68
The investments of U.S. corporations in China almost
quadrupled between 1994 and 2001.169 Companies such as Ford, DuPont, Ford,
IBM, Lucent Technologies, General Electric, Microsoft, General Motors,
Motorola, Intel, and Rohm and Haas have taken part in international joint
ventures in China. I" ° These joint ventures have provided opportunities for U.S.
businesses to market directly to China.
Unfortunately, these profitable
opportunities have also led to heightened risk of violations of the FCPA.
162 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).

163Franklin C. Jesse, Jr. & Gary Plant Mooty, InternationalJoint Ventures, SM053 ALI-ABA 457,
460 (2006).
164 id.
165 id.

'66 Kim Newby, Doing Business in China: How the State of 1.3 Million Can Tap the Nation of 1.3
Billion, 19 ME. B.J. 238, 239 (2004).
167Francisco Moris, U.S.-China R&D Linkages: DirectInvestment and IndustrialAlliances in the
1990s, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., 1, 1(Feb. 2004).
168 Id.

169Id. at 2.
170 Id.
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A U.S.-China joint venture runs an unreasonably substantial risk of
FCPA violations for three reasons. First, the U.S.-half of the joint venture will
usually lack control of general business operations. Second, the joint venture
will most likely be largely owned by a Chinese entity that is accustomed to
making or receiving corrupt payments. Finally, there is always a substantial risk
that the Chinese entity will have some level of government ownership or
control, thus rendering it a "foreign official" for purposes of the FCPA.
B. "Foreign Officials" in China
The FCPA only deals with corrupt payments made to foreign
government officials, thus excluding the making of such payments to foreign
persons who are not governmental officials. One of the more complex problems
a U.S. corporation faces when doing business in China is determining exactly
who falls into the category of a "foreign official." The FCPA defines a "foreign
official" as:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public
international organization, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
for or on behalf of
department, agency, or instrumentality, or171
any such public international organization.
In an FCPA opinion released in 1993 regarding a joint venture between
a U.S. commercial organization and a commercial entity that was owned and
supervised by a foreign government, the DOJ interpreted the phrase "officer or
employee of a foreign government" to include government-owned businesses.172
This interpretation is also supported by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which defined a
"foreign public official" as:
[A]ny person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial
office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country,
including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any
official or agent of a public international organization.173
'
72

15 U.S.C. §78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (2000).
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt PracticeAct Review Opinion ProcedureRelease No. 93-

01, (Apr. 20, 1993), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1993/9301.html.
17 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign
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This presents a significant problem for U.S. businesses seeking to
conduct business in China where "state-owned firms... are among the largest in
China and include more than half the country's industrial assets." 174 Most
businesses that are listed on the Chinese stock exchanges are state owned
enterprises with strong links to the government. 175 Moreover, there is a
tendency in China for business personnel to simultaneously hold multiple
positions in the government or political arena. 176 Thus, it is highly likely that
the DOJ and SEC would view a senior executive of a large Chinese company as
a "foreign official" for purposes of the FCPA.
The case involving Diagnostic Products (discussed in part IV, A) was a
perfect example of the DOJ concluding that government-owned hospitals in
China were government instrumentalities, thus rendering the physicians and
laboratory personnel "foreign officials" under the FCPA. 177 Despite an apparent
move by China to begin the privatization of state owned enterprises, 178 several
questions still remain regarding a Chinese business that is not completely
controlled by the state. Given the lack of clear guidance, U.S. corporations are
forced into a precarious position where they must assume that everyone they
deal with in China will fall into the category of a "foreign official."
PART VI: IS THE FCPA PUTTING THE UNITED STATES AT A
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE IN CHINA?
One of the prevalent, on-going criticisms of the FCPA is that it puts
U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage compared to their foreign
counterparts who are under no such rigorous anti-bribery restrictions as the
FCPA. 179 In 1998 Congress realized that since the enactment of the FCPA, U.S.
businesses "operated at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors

Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,3455,en_2649_37447-2017813-1 1-1-37447,00.html.
174The Long and Winding Road to Privatizationin China, supra note 8.
175Stoyan Tenev, Chunlin Zhang & Loup Brefort, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE
REFORM IN CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 83 (Mar. 15, 2002),

available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/publications.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/CorpGovernanceinChinaFullReport/
$FILE/CGinChinaFullReport.pdf.
176Samuel Porteous, Foreign CorruptPracticeAct Issues in China, BUSINESS GUIDE TO BEIING
AND NORTH-EAST CHINA, Mar. 2006, availableat

http://www.navigantconsulting.com/A559B l/navigantnew.nsf/vGNCNTByDocKey/PPE3DF4B4F2
030/$FILE/FCPAissuesChina.pdf.
177Dep't of Justice, supra note 121.
178
How to Make China Even Richer, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 2006, at11.
179Terry Collingsworth, "Corporate Social Responsibility" Unmasked, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
669, 673 (2004).
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who.. .continued to pay bribes without fear of penalty." 180 With corporate
protests over the FCPA growing, Congress directed the Executive Branch to
begin negotiations with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to encourage the major trading partners of the United
States to enact laws similar to the FCPA.18 1 Members of the Convention82 were
required to implement laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.,
The end results of the OECD Convention have been criticized due to
conflicting laws that were subsequently enacted by the member nations, and an
overall lack of uniform enforcement of anti-bribery provisions.183 Howard
Weissman, Associate General Counsel-International of Lockheed Martin
Corporation, noted:
I believe that some progress has been made in raising the awareness of
non-U.S. companies of the need for anti-bribery compliance. I do not believe,
however, that the "playing field" has been leveled yet for U.S. companies. I do
not think this will happen until some of the other OECD countries have actually
brought enforcement actions and imposed penalties on companies and
individuals within their jurisdictions
for directly or indirectly paying or offering
84
bribes to foreign officials.'
Critics of OECD, as well as other anti-corruption efforts, have been
quick to point out the limited impact and enforcement of its measures and have
also expressed pessimism on the prospects of any quick and efficient changes in
the global business environment.185 A study conducted by World Bank
concluded that "US anti-corruption legislation and the OECD anti-bribery
Convention, were not leading 'to higher standards of corporate conduct among
foreign investors' .' 186 The United States, therefore, remains at a competitive
business disadvantage with other nations that conduct business operations in
China and do not enforce the provisions of OECD or their own anti-bribery
provisions as vigorously as the U.S. government enforces the FCPA. Moreover,

80 S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998).

Mark L. Tuft, ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct, 701 PLIILIT 167, 192 (2003).
182See Org. for Econ. Co-op & Dev., supra note 173.
183Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the InternationalBribery Conventions, 50 AM. J.
18'

COMP. L., 593, 613-614 (2002).
184Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Roundtable: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct-Its Many Lives, 1544

PL/CORP 179, 321 May 2006.
185Cecil Hunt, Recent MultilateralMeasures to Combat Corruption,SJ078 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 259, 265
(2004).
186Susan Hawley, Briefing 30: UnderwritingBribery, Export Credit Agencies and Corruption,
THE CORNER HOUSE, Dec. 2003, at 2 (citing Joel S. Hellman, et al., Farfrom Home: Do Foreign
Investors Import HigherStandards of Governance in TransitionEconomies?, (The World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper, 2002),
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/farfromhome.pdf.).
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China is not an OECD member nation 87 and with the exception of a minor,
distended corruption project of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(hereinafter "APEC"), Asia has no regional convention to deal with
corruption. 88

The FCPA has not reduced corruption in other countries mainly
because foreign countries that have no firm anti-corruption laws, or simply do
not aggressively enforce the laws they do have, are eager to seize a business
opportunity that a U.S. corporation could not take due to the FCPA. 18 9 As a
result, U.S. business operations have been significantly curtailed in emerging
countries such as China. In fact, a survey of 250 of the top 1000 businesses in
the United States by the General Accounting Office resulted in 30% of the
respondents claiming that the FCPA had a negative impact on its overseas
business operations. 190 A study of the FCPA, conducted by the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, revealed not only a
significant decline in U.S business operations in corrupt countries since the
enactment of the FCPA, but also a shift from the U.S. to foreign countries that
were more willing to make corrupt payments.' 9' The study concluded that:
The apparent relative decline of American business activity in
the more-corrupt countries after 1977 does not necessarily
imply US legislation reduced total levels of foreign business
activity, of even bribe payments by foreign multinationals, in
these countries. The reason is that foreign firms may simply
have replaced American firms in the more bribery-intensive
activities in these countries, either by acquiring US operations
or through the withdrawal of US firms from the market. US
187Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Ratification of the Convention on
the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en-2649_201185_1889402 1 1 1_l,00.html
(listing the OECD member nations as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States).
188Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in the United
States: Trends and the Effects of InternationalStandards, Practicing Law Institute (citing APEC
Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Transparency (Sept. 2004),
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec-groups/other-apec-groups/anti-corruption.htmnl)..
189 See generally Shang-Jin Wei, BRIBERY INTHE ECONOMIES: GREASE OR SAND? (THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2000), available at

https://www.brookings.edu/-ImedialFiles/rc/papers/2000/0115globalization-wei/20000115.pdf.
190Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct to Include a PrivateRight of Action,
82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 208-9 (1994) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BuSINESS, at 60 (1981)).
'9' James Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977, NBER
WORKING PAPER 5266, Sept. 1995, at 1.
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legislation in 1976 and 1977 changes the relative attractiveness
of more-corrupt and less corrupt locations for US investors,
substitution between American
thereby encouraging ownership
192
and foreign investors.
The evidence is conclusive that the FCPA does, in fact, cause U.S. corporations
to lose significant business opportunities in transitional economies such as
China.
Corruption remains an unsettling issue in China; one that is, according
to Prime Minister Wen Jiabo, becoming "more and more serious" and one that
193
Chinese leadership has been criticized for failing to aggressively pursue.
Nevertheless, if the United States is to remain competitive in a fast-paced,
global environment, it cannot ignore or significantly reduce its business dealings
in China. With a population of over 1.3 billion people 194 - amounting to
roughly one-sixth of the world's population1 95 - and the expectation that China
will be the world's top trading nation in the next ten years,' 96 U.S. businesses
simply cannot afford to cut themselves out of that customer base. China's
transition from a non-capitalist regime to a modem economy raises questions as
to whether the United States should continue in its lonely quest to discourage
corrupt payments through enforcement of the FCPA.
PART VII: AMENDING, RELAXING OR REPEALING THE FCPA
The vagueness of the FCPA, the current trend in government
enforcement actions, and the lack of clear guidance by which U.S. businesses
can legally operate, renders the Act unworkable in China's current climate of
corruption. Therefore, the intricate conflict between the need to take advantage
of the thriving Chinese economy and the competitive disadvantage the United
States presently faces, requires that the FCPA be revisited to determine what
steps, if any, should be taken to modify, strengthen or abolish the Act together.

at 19-20.
193Corruption in China, supra note 6 at 44.
'92 Id.

Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, supra note 68.
Id. (stating that the world population as of July 6, 2007 was 6.6 billion which was used to derive
this fraction) available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/print/xx.html.
1'4 Central
195

196Eban Kaplan, The Uneasy U.S. - Chinese Trade Relationship, Councilon ForeignRelationships,

Apr. 19, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publicationllO482/uneasy-uschinese-trade-relationship.html.
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
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A. Repealing the FCPA: A Duplicitous Act
While a U.S. corporation may be at a competitive disadvantage with
other nations that do not rigorously enforce their anti-corruption laws, FCPA
compliance remains critical for three reasons, aside from avoiding DOJ and
SEC criminal and civil liability. The first reason is the recent international
recognition of the negative impacts of corruption on a global level and the
subsequent efforts to curtail corrupt international business practices. Second,
China is slowly beginning to witness the overall impacts of corruption on its
own economy and now has incentive to either comply with, or implement new,
anti-corruption regulations. Third is the necessity for the United States to
continue its efforts to level the proverbial "playing field" in its anti-corruption
efforts and set an example for other nations with regard to international business
transactions.
Over the last decade, there has been a rather remarkable international
interest in combating corruption which can be seen by numerous regional
conventions such as the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 97 the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 198 the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption,' 99 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption. 200 In addition to these various regional agreements, the United
Nations (hereinafter "UN") recently took action to combat corruption on a
global level. In October of 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Convention against Corruption. 201
The Convention imposed numerous
requirements on its signatories to take affirmative steps to criminalize
corruption and implement mechanisms to combat international crimes of
corruption. 202 The Convention, which was "widely supported by developing
countries,, 20 3 was ratified by China in 2005 in an aggressive step to manage its
overwhelming problem with corruption.2 4
Recent studies indicate that despite its economic growth, China is
being negatively affected by corruption.20 5 In the short run, corruption has
197Hunt, supra note 185, at 261.
198Id.
'99Id. at 261-62.
20oId. at 262.
201See G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 108.
202See id.
203Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Boarders,47 VA. J. INT'L L.
413,429 (Winter 2007).
204 ChinaDaily.com, China to Ratify UN Convention Against Corruption, ChinaDaily.com,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/22/content_487050.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2005).
205Andrew White, The Paradox of Corruption as Antitheses to Economic Development in Indonesia
and China and Why Are the Experiences Different in Each Country?,8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1,
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contributed to China's economic growth, however the long term effects of
corruption may end up actually distorting the Chinese economy.2 °6 Corruption
has recently led to reduced economic output which has caused a drain on the
Chinese economy. 207 Professor Angang, an economist at Tsinghua University,
noted that "China may very well be the country with the most enormous
economic losses in the world caused by corruption., 20 8 Thus, now more than
ever, China has some incentive to deal with its corruption crisis.
The large number of countries that have signed on to the UN
Convention against Corruption (including China) should be an unmistakable
indication of the global willingness of nations to be subject to anti-corruption
laws. 20 9 As such, the United States must continue to set the global standard
when regulating business operations in China by forcing U.S. corporations to
comply with the provisions of the FCPA. The long term impacts of the failure
to do so will greatly outweigh the short-term benefits of conducting business in
China while utilizing corrupt practices.
In addition to undermining global efforts to curb corrupt practices,
allowing corrupt payments would encourage U.S. businesses to develop
effective bribery programs, rather than overall efficiency and a good work
product. Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, the Senate Banking Committee
noted:
[Bribery] short-circuits the marketplace by directing business
to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of
price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in honest
salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products.
In short, it rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts
pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk
losing business.210
Abolishing the FCPA and allowing for corruption would undermine the
economic interests of the United States by pressuring businesses to remain
competitive through lowering their ethical standards rather than by encouraging
competition based on quality products and services. As such, U.S. corporations
must continue to set the global standard when conducting business operations in

2(2006).
206 id.

207See id. at 32 (citing Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., FAULT LINES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC TERRAIN 32-33

(2003), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph- reports/MR I686/MR 1686.pref.pdf).
208Hu Angang, Public Exposure of Economic Losses Resultingfrom Corruption,4 CHINA &
WORLD ECON., 44, 48 (2002).

209Delaney, supra note 110, at 429.
210Unlawful Corporate Payment Act of 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-640 at 4-5 (1977).
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China by complying with the provisions of the FCPA, even if that means
operating at a competitive disadvantage with countries that do not aggressively
enforce anti-corruption laws.
B. Strengthening the FCPA: Providing Real Time Guidance in a
Fast-Paced Global Economy
The DOJ's FCPA opinion procedure allows a business or individual
seeking to take part in a foreign business operation to make a specific inquiry to
the DOJ as to whether the proposed business conduct would violate the FCPA.
This process is designed to "enable issuers and domestic concerns to obtain an
opinion of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospectiveconforms with the Department's present
not hypothetical -conduct
enforcement policy regarding the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977. '21'

The DOJ has 30 days to respond to the inquiry and

must either issue an opinion as to whether the proposed conduct would violate
212
the FCPA, or request additional information regarding the business operation.
While the opinion procedure has the potential of being tremendously
beneficial to U.S. corporations who have hesitations regarding a business
transaction in China, the procedure, overall, is rarely utilized. In fact, the DOJ's
recent aggressive stance on FCPA enforcement has been criticized as "all stick
and no carrot," with criminal investigations on the rise, yet no increase in U.S.
businesses' use of the procedure.2 13 Since the procedure was enacted in 1980,
there have been roughly 43 requests for guidance. 2 4 From 1993 to 2006 there
were only 22 requests made by U.S. businesses for guidance, with four or less
requests made each year. 215 The slow process of the opinion procedure was the
most common criticism cited by U.S. businesses that are often in the position of
having to put together complex business propositions for submission and do not
have a month to wait for a DOJ opinion before engaging in an overseas
transaction. 226
With China rapidly undergoing both social and economic change, the
217
country is starting to witness consistent changes to its laws, region by region.
211 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2003).
212 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2003).
213 Mark Miller, More Carrot, Less Stick, SAN FRANCIsco RECORDER, Dec. 15, 2006.

ld.
215See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion Procedure Releases, available at
214

http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion (listing twenty-two total Opinion Procedure
Releases between 1993 and 2006) (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
216 Miller, supra note 213.
217 Kevin Orfield, Go East Young Executive: Doing Business in China is Finally Starting To Pay
Off, But is the Time Right for Your Company?,
http://www.bus.wisc.edu/update/winter05/business in-china.asp.
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The Chinese government "looks at rules as works in progress. So, business
decisions based on rules may not be correct a couple months later. 2 18 If the
facts provided by a U.S. corporation regarding a foreign business transaction in
the initial DOJ opinion procedure query are altered, then the DOJ opinion will
not be binding on the U.S. business. 21 9 This severely limits the flexibility by
which a U.S. business can operate abroad.
China, while not traditionally a cultural environment accustomed to
quick business dealings, is rapidly becoming an economic environment where
U.S. corporations are forced into a position of seizing a business opportunity
promptly. China's rapid transformation from a state controlled-planned
economy to a market-based economy requires that U.S. corporations move
quickly to implement business operations or potentially lose the opportunity to a
foreign competitor. 220 As one commentator observed, "[y]ou may think you
have a deal [in China] and a day or two later something changes - that's just the
way it is. ' ' 22 1 In this fast-paced Chinese economy, the 30-day opinion procedure
of the DOJ (sometimes longer if additional information is requested) is simply
too long for a U.S. corporation to wait before it can agree upon the terms of a
Chinese business operation. Moreover, "companies are not likely to have
complete information about a transaction until it is ready to go - which is
usually the point when a company is least likely to be able to put it on hold
while DOJ deliberates. 222 This presents a problem for corporations that may
greatly benefit from the DOJ opinion procedure. Once the opinion procedure is
triggered, a U.S. business has no way to predict when the procedure will be
concluded.
The DOJ currently has sufficient resources available to investigate and
prosecute cases involving bribery. 3 However, more resources need to be
devoted to the opinion procedure to assist the DOJ in fulfilling its
responsibilities of providing real-time guidance to businesses at the outset of an
overseas operation. The procedure would operate more effectively if, absent a
response by the DOJ within one week, the U.S. business is able to proceed with
the business transaction with the understanding that the DOJ agrees that the
transaction will not violate the FCPA.
In addition to its slow pace, the opinion procedure has "no application
to any party which does not join in the request for the opinion ' 224 Moreover,

218

Id.

2 9 28 C.F.R. Part 80.5 (2003).
220 Orfield, supra note 217.
221 Id.
222 Miller, supra note 213.
223 Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of InstitutionalDesign: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 665, 707 (2004).
22428 C.F.R. § 80.5 (2003).
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there is very little case law on the FCPA2 25 which sets precedent for a U.S.
business to operate legally. Problems with FCPA compliance are the result not
only of its vague language, but also the lack of guidance provided to U.S.
businesses.226 Therefore, rather than confining its opinions to a specific set of
individual facts, the opinion procedure must create precedent and provide
overall guidance to U.S. corporations.
Strengthening the opinion procedure through efficiency and overall
FCPA education would be beneficial to both U.S. corporations and the U.S.
government. First, it will encourage a U.S. corporation to take advantage of the
already under-utilized DOJ opinion procedure if the corporation believes it can
receive real-time FCPA guidance. Second, given the recent increase in FCPA
investigations conducted by the DOJ and SEC and the costs incurred, the
benefits of devoting more resources to strengthening the opinion procedure
would be worth the costs. 227 Finally, allowing the opinion procedure to serve as
precedent for later decisions would be a substantial step in furtherance of
eliminating the vagueness of the FCPA.
C. Amending the FCPA: Eliminate the Vagueness or Fortify the Red Flags
The legislative history of the FCPA supports the argument that the Act
was not meant to punish a U.S. corporation for mere negligence.228 However, as
of late, the DOJ has been increasingly willing to prosecute U.S. businesses for
conduct that is not clearly actionable under a strict reading of the FCPA by
utilizing many varying theories of liability. 229 This was most notably observed
in the DPC prosecution, where FCPA violations were charged based on the
theory that
Tianjin Co. was acting as a subsidiary of its California-based
230
company.
Employees of a U.S. corporation may "turn a blind eye and allow
improper payments through third-party intermediaries under the misguided
assumption that such payments will not violate U.S. law. 231 While a foreign
agent is not subject to the FCPA, the agent's conduct may create FCPA
exposure for a U.S. corporation. This poses a substantial problem in China,

225Koch, supra note 38, at 400.
226Jennifer Dawn Taylor,Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Unnecessary Costs of
Fighting Corruption?,61 LA. L. REV. 861, 881 (2001).
227Miller, supra note 213.
22' H.R. Rep. No. 100-576 at 920 (1988).
229Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluatingand
Forecastingthe Trend of More Frequentand Severe ProsecutionsUnder the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN L. 285, 309-10 (2007).
230Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supranote 121.
231Utterback, supra note 101.
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where conducting business operations generally requires the use of local agents
and partners, and the "responsibility for dealing with local government officials
and obtaining necessary approvals is typically not in the foreign investor's
hands but lies with the Chinese partner., 232 The FCPA prohibits not only direct
bribery, but also corrupt payments through the use of such an intermediary.233
A U.S. business can therefore be liable under the FCPA for corrupt payments
made through an intermediary if they knew or should have known the payments
would go to a foreign official.234 Specifically, a business can be held liable even
if it "is aware... that such circumstance [for bribery] exists. 235 The requisite
"knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the
existence of such circumstance [for bribery]. 236 This extraordinarily broad
language affords the DOJ the advantage of having to prove only that a U.S.
business knew of the "likelihood" of a corrupt payment, rather than an actual
corrupt payment.
In a situation where a corporation should have known that an
intermediary has made or will make a corrupt payment, the DOJ will look at
whether the corporation was aware of any "red-flags" that would trigger
knowledge of an FCPA violation, including:
[U]nusual payment patterns or financial arrangements, a
history of corruption in the country, a refusal by the foreign
joint venture partner or representative to provide a
certification that it will not take any action in furtherance of an
unlawful offer, promise, or payment to a foreign public
official and not take any act that would cause the U.S. firm to
be in violation of the FCPA, unusually high commissions, lack
of transparency in expenses and accounting records, apparent
lack of qualifications or resources on the part of the joint
venture partner or representative to perform the services
offered, and whether the joint venture partner or representative
has been recommended by an official of the potential

232 Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct: A Minefieldfor US Companies in China,

CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Nov. 2004,

http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article.ospx?StorylD=4314.
233 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (2000).
21415 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A) (2000) states that "[a] person's state of mind is "knowing" with
respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if-- (i) such person is aware that such person is
engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to
occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is
substantially certain to occur."
23 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
236 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(B) (2000).
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governmental customer.237
While attention to the red flags will help shield a U.S. business from
FCPA liability, the red flag provisions are extraordinarily subjective and impose
a significantly greater restriction on U.S. businesses than other countries,
especially since a U.S. business is subject to the provisions of the FCPA even if
the corrupt payments made have no connection to the U.S. business.238
The general red flag provisions, coupled with the statutory language of
the FCPA, places a U.S. corporation conducting business operations in China at
a constant, unreasonably dangerous risk. Given the current level of corruption
in China, U.S. business operations are likely to trigger general red flag
provisions such as "a history of corruption in the country,' 239 thereby giving the

DOJ the advantage of easily proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the U.S.
business knew that "such circumstance [for bribery] exists. 240 In China's
present climate of corruption such circumstances always exist. A U.S.
corporation can be held liable for acts of an intermediary even if the business
lacked knowledge, intent, or participation in the act just by nature of the fact
that China is regarded as an environment where corruption is high, and the
circumstances in which corrupt payments can be made always exist in such an
environment. The general red flag provisions are, therefore, either meaningless
or overly broad when applied to U.S. business operations in China.
The FCPA should be amended to remove the broad language that
would give rise to expansive theories of civil and criminal liability.
Specifically, the requirement that a person or a corporation has a "knowing"
state of mind if "such circumstances exist," should be removed from the
statute. 24 ' An FCPA cause of action could still be initiated utilizing the
242
knowledge inference of "aware that such person is engaging in such conduct,"
if a U.S. corporation was aware that an intermediary was taking part in corrupt
payments. Furthermore, this amendment would not impede the government
from pursuing an FCPA action against a U.S. corporation that turned a blind eye
to corrupt activities, since the knowledge inference of "substantially certain to
occur ' 243 would remain intact. Thus, the "bury the head in the sand" approach
23' LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE TO FCPA, supra note 29 (emphasis added).
238 Paul
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to corrupt payments made by intermediaries would remain a non-defense to the
FCPA.
In the absence of an amendment to the FCPA removing the overly
broad scienter requirement for FCPA liability if "such circumstance (for
bribery) exists," a common middle ground must be established with regard to
the red flag provisions of the FCPA. This middle ground would contain two
distinct factors essentially augmenting the red flag provision which is triggered
when "history of corruption in the country" 244 exists. First, since the DOJ's
opinion procedure provides little guidance or precedent, the provision should be
modified in a manner which would specifically construe the phrase "such
circumstances" to include specific enumerated acts of a foreign country that
would put a U.S. business on notice of a strong possibility of corrupt payments
being made, as opposed to simply looking at the annual Transparency
International report2 45 to determine the general corruption level in the country.
Second, if specific acts do exist, a U.S. business would then be required to have
adequate and enforceable corporate controls in place, the absence of which
would lead to a greater level of FCPA exposure. Removing the overly broad
language of the FCPA would eliminate much of its ambiguity and thereby allow
U.S. corporations with business operations in China to operate with less concern
of DOJ or SEC action, while still requiring those corporations to exercise due
diligence in corporate operations.
Alternatively, augmenting the red flag "history of corruption"
provision to provide more detailed criteria of its triggering mechanisms would
allow U.S. corporate compliance policies to be modified in a manner that would
reflect a new legal framework for avoiding FCPA liability. Neither course of
action would hinder the FCPA's ability to effectuate its overall purpose of
combating corrupt payments abroad and instilling public confidence in the
global business environment.
CONCLUSION
2 46
The FCPA continues to be one of the most controversial U.S. laws
due largely in part to the perception that U.S. businesses are not on an even
playing field in a competitive, global environment. Nonetheless, despite its
many shortcomings and less than practicable application to U.S. business
operations in China, the FCPA is essential in maintaining the stance of the
United States on eliminating corruption and preserving the integrity of the
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global market. The FCPA is capable of achieving these advantages, without
putting U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage in transitional nations
such as China, with more guidance by the DOJ and less ambiguity in the statute.
While both U.S. corporations and the U.S. government would like to
witness the elimination of China's corruption problem during this time when the
Chinese economy continues to thrive, the problem is not one that is subject to a
quick fix. As one commentator noted:
Viewed from the ground, one often finds sympathy for the cause of
reducing corruption, but pessimism about the prospects. Some officials in
private simply say that corruption is so deeply rooted in the fast-growing
economy and its fabric so tightly interwoven, that it is difficult to discern
whether things are improving or degrading. Most agree that this is not a battle
to be won in some definable time frame; rather, it is a very long march.247
Corruption in China is not a problem that is going to disappear anytime
in the near future. Developing methods to curb the problem with corruption will
be a long arduous process. If China maintains some level of control of its
corruption problem and witnesses a decrease in corruption overall, the level of
governmental scrutiny faced by U.S. businesses will most likely decrease as
well. However, at the present time, while the perception of China continues to
be that of a corruption-plagued nation, the DOJ and SEC will continue to be
248
increasingly focused on U.S. corporations with business operations in China.
Recent FCPA enforcement actions should be an unmistakable
indication to U.S. corporations that when conducting business operations in
China, they must have a rigorous FCPA compliance program in place that will
shield them from the appearance of impropriety. As one commentator noted,
"[ft]here is a common misperception that when 'no one is watching,' U.S. law
does not apply. As the FCPA demonstrates, nothing could be further from the
truth. Companies that believe otherwise, do so at their own peril." 249 Recent
cases and the continued focus on potential FCPA violations in China should be
an indication to all U.S. businesses that someone is, in fact, always watching
closely.
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